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Abstract
This study addressed two issues in sentence memory: Hie accuracy of
Gestalt rpresentations of sentences over strictly associative 
accounts, and the role of syntactic, semantic, and thematic variables 
in characterizing the organizational basis of sentence 
representations. Sixteen pairs of SVO sentences were generated with a 
single noun shared by both member sentences of each pair. After a 
study period during which subjects wrote expansions of stimulus 
sentences, memory for the shared nouns was tested using subject-verb 
or object-verb cues from one or both member sentences of each pair. 
According to associative accounts of sentence memory, mixed cues using 
one component each from both members of a sentence pair should have 
been more effective prompts for recall of target nouns than original 
cues formed from only one of the sentences in a pair. In contrast to 
the associative predictions the original cues were more likely to 
prompt meaning-preserving recall of the target nouns, suggesting that 
theories of sentence memory should incorporate Gestalt 
representations. In the same experiment, the semantic, syntactic, and 
thematic role of the sentence components was factorially varied such 
that each target noun was either a case-grammar agent or object, 
either subject or predicate, and either given information or new 
information. Hie differing sentential roles of target nouns produced 
no reliable variations in cued recall. Potential explanations for the 
absence of the expected results with regard to the second issue are 
offered.
2Associative, Semantic, Thematic, and Syntactic Factors 
in the Memory Representations of Sentences
In the past fifteen to twenty years we have witnessed a rapid 
growth in the volume of theory and research pertaining to memory for 
assorted linguistic units, particularly sentences- This work appears 
to serve a dual purpose in that while it contributes to our 
understanding of memory in general, it focuses on memory where it is 
probably most commonly applied, that is, memory for meaning as 
conveyed by language. A vast collection of issues and questions have 
emerged from this area, some of which are firmly rooted in 
linguistics, others primarily of interest to students of memory. 
Hiis collection includes various efforts to find psychological reality 
for concepts developed in linguistic theory, attempts to specify the 
level at which information contained in sentences is stored in 
long-term memory, and the use of linguistic units to resolve issues 
about the nature of memory in general. The purpose of this effort is 
to review some aspects of the above issues in sentence memory, and to 
provide experimental evidence which helps to clarify at least one of 
them.
Associative Theories of Sentence Memory.
In several cases research and theory in sentence memory has been 
directed toward the confirmation or disconfirmation of relatively
3comprehensive theories of memory that include accounts of the 
interface between memory and language. This class of theories, 
primarily associative in nature, includes the Human Associative MemofJ^ 
(HAM) model proposed by Anderson and Bower (1973), the LNR model of 
Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman (see Norman and Rumelhart, 1975), and 
the ACT model more recently formulated by Anderson (1976). These 
theories hold in common the notion that the mental representation of 
knowledge consists of a network of semantically defined concept nodes 
connected by a set of relational links (called pathways) such that a 
variety of fundamentally associative relationships exist between 
assorted concept nodes. In this way, information to be stored in 
memory is encoded in terms of the concept nodes involved and the 
nature and number of associative links connecting them. When a 
subject studies a sentence, for example, the resulting internal 
representation consists of a set of newly formed associative links 
between the long-term memory concept nodes corresponding to the words 
used in the sentence. In both RAM and ACT the hierarchical structure 
of the associative links connecting the concept nodes of the 
representation preserve in abstract form the structural relationships 
of the sentence components, designating, for instance, 
subject-predicate relations.
Retrieval of information from this type of storage structure 
requires the activation of the concept nodes involved via their 
relational links, a process which usually begins at one or more
4concept nodes whose activation has resulted from some internal or 
external cue. Whether or not all of the information originally 
contained in the sentence is to be retrieved depends on the 
effectiveness of the associative pathways involved in the 
representation. The effectiveness of associative pathways, 
traditionally expressed in terms of probabilities (Anderson and Bower, 
1972, 1973, Foss and Harwood, 1975), in turn depends on a number of
variables, not the least of which is the recency and frequency of 
prior activations (Anderson, 1976).
An interesting corrolary of the HAM model is the idea that the 
memory representations of two sentences which share components (for 
example, a direct object) also share concept nodes, such that the 
sentence representations are linked and not independent in mrlory (see 
Figure 1). This position directly conflicts with what has been termed 
the Gestalt or configural view of sentence memory which maintains that 
sentences are encoded and stored as holistic units whether they share 
components or not. The Gestalt attitude toward sentence memory was 
extrapolated from the writings of Koffka (1935) and Kohler (1938, 
1947) by Anderson and Bower (1972, 1973), in accordance with their own 
pre-experimental intuitions about sentence memory. Although the 
Gestalt view of sentence memory is not systematic and does not 
approach the status of highly developed models like HAM and ACT, its 
position with regard to the question of the memory representations of 
two separate sentences which share a component noun seems to be a
5relatively clear-cut extension of the Gestalt tradition of holism: 
Each sentence forms a unified whole of which each component is an
integral part. Thus, each representation is relatively independent in
memory, the occurrence of the shared component is linked to the 
context in which it occurs, and, therefore, sentences which share 
components should be relatively unconfused during storage and 
retrieval. The HAM position, that representations of sentences which 
share components are linked together in memory, emerged in response to 
early experiments conducted by Anderson and Bower (1972) which 
indicated that the Gestalt position was incorrect. Since that time an 
issue has developed regarding this question, resulting in a small but 
well defined body of research and commentary focusing on the HAM model 
and its treatment of this problem.
One of the more prominent experimental designs used in the area 
is what has been called the crossover design, developed by Anderson 
and Bower (1972). In this procedure, subjects were asked to study
sentences like (1) and (2) below, which share direct objects:
In a cued recall test with the target being the object and the subject 
and verb serving as the cue, 'mixed' cues were constructed with the 
subject from one sentence and the verb from the other sentence, 
yielding cues like (3) and (4) below:
The minister praised the landlord (1)
The child hit the landlord (2)
The minister hit the (3)
6The child praised t he____________ . (4)
The HAM model predicted that recall of the object given mixed cues 
like (3) and (4) would be better than recall given original cues like 
(5) or (6):
The minister praised the____________ . (5)
The child hit t h e____________ . (6)
The reasoning behind this prediction, referring to Figure 1, 
involves the probability of effectiveness of certain associative 
pathways (designated a, b, and c) at the time of recall. Following 
Anderson and Bower*s notation, the probability of recalling the object 
given an original cue (PfO/S-jV-j)} equals the probability of effective 
pathways from a to c and from b to c less the probability of 
effectiveness of a to b to c. (Equation 1). The probability of
object recall given a mixed cue, on the other hand, is equal to the
probability of effective pathways from a to c and from b to c less the
probability of a to c to b to c (Equation 2). Since abc must be
greater than acbc, inequality (1) must hold true.
EQ Is P(0/SiVi) = ac + be - abc
EQ 2s P(0/S]V2) = ac + be - acbc
INI: PfO/SiVx) C P(0/S1V 2)
Experiments examining the recall of objects as a function of
original and mixed cues have in general indicated that the predicted 
advantage of mixed cues is tenuous at best. Out of four experiments 
reported by Anderson and Bower (1972), two found slightly better
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8object recall given mixed cues, while the other two showed much better 
recall given original cues. At the time, the magnitude of the 
configural effect (advantage of original cues over mixed cues) was 
attributed to a procedure used in the latter two experiments where 
subjects were asked to write continuations of the study sentences, a 
task designed to ensure that subjects were processing the stimulus 
sentences meaningfully. It was felt that the probability of recalling 
a continuation was greater for an original cue than for a mixed cue, 
and that, once recalled, the continuation served as a further prompt 
for the object.
More recently, Foss and Harwood (1975) asked subjects to give 
meaningfulness ratings of stimulus sentences in essentially the same 
design, intending to require meaningful processing of stimulus 
sentences without the generation of continuations. In contrast to the 
Anderson and Bower interpretation, they obtained a substantial 
configural effect. They explained their findings by positing the 
existence of configural memory traces (nodes) occurring in conjunction 
with associative traces, such that, for example, the associative nodes 
of 'child' and 'hit' might be combined into a single configural node, 
'child-hit.' Essentially their position is an associative one, except 
that some of the concept nodes are configural in nature while some are 
purely associative. Foss and Harwood go on to claim that configural 
nodes occur primarily at higher overall levels of recall and that the 
more atomistic associative nodes predominate at lower levels of
9recall. In accounting for Anderson and Bower's data they point to 
differences in overall level of recall, claiming that the origin of 
the configural effect found in the latter two studies was the result 
of generally higher recall performance in those samples. In Foss and 
Harwood's words "Anderson and Bower were victimized by the good 
memories of their subjects" (1975, p. 13). What Foss and Harwood do 
not explain is why configural and associative traces (nodes) are 
connected with varying levels of general memory performance. It would 
seem more parsimonious to say that configural and associative traces, 
whatever their exact nature might be, are a correlate of general 
memory performance, not the ultimate cause. That is, it seems 
plausible that some third variable, possibly encoding, governs the 
formation of configural and associative traces, which in turn reflects 
general memory performance, and which is linked causally to the 
emergence of configural effects. The problem then becomes a matter of 
understanding what causes the formation of configural and associative 
traces. In short, regardless of Foss and Harwood's assertions about 
configural and associative traces, the question is simply a matter of 
understanding why configural effects occur in some situations and not 
others.
Anderson (1976), in pointing out that the relationship between 
level of recall and the magnitude of the configural effect has not 
been consistent, has suggested that meaningful processing of stimulus 
sentences is the operative variable in producing configural effects.
10
This explanation has been supported by the findings of Carr and 
Bacharach (1978) which found a significant advantage in recognition of 
original cues over mixed cues given an orientation task requiring 
processing of the overall meaning of each stimulus sentence, and an 
advantage of mixed over original cues given a selective orientation 
task, where subjects were asked to focus on certain components of each 
stimulus sentence (that is, agent, verb, or object). Put simply, 
meaningful processing of stimulus sentences facilitated recognition 
accuracy of original over mixed cues, suggesting that the manner in 
which subjects orient to stimulus sentences influences how those 
sentences are represented in memory.
In Anderson's ACT model the previous HAM position regarding the 
effectiveness of original and mixed cues is reversed, predicting an 
advantage of original cues over mixed cues when the stimulus sentences 
are processed meaningfully. The ACT account is based on the 
proposition that an object noun is encoded in a context-sensitive 
fashion according to the subject and verb with which it occurs. As 
Anderson terms it, there is a specific 'sense,' determined by the 
total sentence configuration, which governs the encoding of the object 
in each occurrence. This sense is then attached to the long-term 
memory concept node corresponding to the object, and is a part of the 
sentence representation. In the situation where two sentences are 
presented which share an object noun, both senses are attached to the 
concept node, but each is specifically associated with their
11
respective sentence representations. If given an original cue, ACT is 
more likely to recover the appropriate sense of the object and thus to 
recall the object. A mixed cue, however, disrupts both subject-verb 
configurations, and is not therefore as effective a prompt for recall 
of the object noun. Although Anderson claims that ACT is primarily an 
associative model, its treatment of the original versus mixed cue 
controversy seems highly reminiscent of the Gestalt viewpoint, 
barring, of course, the formalisms and representational assumptions.
This paper represents an extension of the crossover design and 
its application toward several questions. Of primary interest are the 
implications that configural effects bear for the strictly associative 
theories of memory such as HAM and LNR. These models have no way of 
accounting for configural effects without extensive modification. 
The discovery of configural effects should encourage theorists to 
incorporate Gestalt-like mechanisms into updated models of sentence 
memory.
In the present study, the orientation task used for the study 
sentences differs from those used previously. Anderson and Bower
(1972) asked subjects to generate continuations to stimulus sentences, 
while Foss and Harwood (1975) had subjects give meaningfulness ratings 
for presented sentences. In this experiment we used expansions, where 
subjects were asked to write a related phrase, clause, or sentence 
which helped to complete the meaning of each stimulus sentence. This 
was intended not only to ensure meaningful processing, but also to
12
encourage subjects to develop episodic elaborations of the event 
described in the sentence. The latter intention was motivated by a 
desire to have subjects treat the sentences as vehicles for 
information, and not as items to be learned in and of themselves. 
Hiis seemed more in line with the actual function of language, that 
is, to convey information.
Traditionally, the crossover design has tested recall for the 
object given mixed or original subject-verb cues, and has ignored the 
question of whether or not mixed or original object-verb cues are 
differentially effective prompts for subject recall. Since the 
predictions of the Gestalt position, HAM, and ACT remain unchanged 
under these circumstances, this potential interaction is of interest. 
In the present study, both subject and object nouns served as targets, 
cued by either mixed or original object-verb or subject-verb prompts, 
respectively. If the relative efficacy of cue types reverses with 
subjects as target nouns, as compared to when objects are the target 
nouns, then all three approaches are compromised.
Another interesting question pertains to Anderson’s (1976) 
treatment of the Gestalt-associative issue. According to Anderson, if 
the presence or absence of configural effects can be attributed to 
differing encoding productions (meaningful or shallow processing), 
then patterns of recall should be related to subjects' ability to 
distinguish between presented constructions and distractor 
constructions. Although this study doesn't use distractors in the
13
strict sense, mixed cues are, in effect, new constructions, in that 
they were not presented among the study sentences (although the 
individual components were seen in other constructions). If Anderson 
is correct we should find that cues which are correctly identified as 
original or mixed are also more likely to prompt recall of the target 
noun. In addition, according to Anderson, original and mixed cues 
should not be differentially effective if a recall analysis is 
performed using only those test items which were correctly identified. 
In other words, if subjects can identify the cue as an old or a new 
configuration then they must have access to both of the 
representations of the shared component sentences and, if this is so, 
then recall of the target noun should be twice as likely as when the 
subject has access to only one of the representations, as would 
presumably be the case were the cue not correctly recognized. An 
analysis of recognition accuracy for original and mixed cues seems 
therefore, to be of interest, remembering, though, that the type of 
distractor used here differs somewhat from that envisioned by 
Anderson. This analysis can be instructive not only in that it 
pertains to Anderson's interpretation, but also because it shows, in 
general, whether or not there are differences in recognition accuracy 
for original and mixed cues. Such a finding would support the results 
of Carr and Bacharach (1978).
The use of the crossover design can also be nicely applied to a 
much larger body of research and theory which, though exceedingly more
14
diverse in terms of theoretical orientations and experimental 
approaches, has generally concerned itself with the question of the 
semantic unity of sentence representations. Several studies have 
found tentative support for the position that sentence representations 
are relatively unitized in memory (James, Thompson, and Baldwin, 1973; 
Green, 1975; Marschark and Paivio, 1977; Rosenberg and Simon, 1977). 
Graesser (1978) has reported evidence which suggests that propositions 
are stored as semantic units and tend to be recalled in an all-or-none 
fashion. Hie emergence of a configural effect within the present 
experimental context would lend additional support for this broad 
viewpoint.
Organizational Foundations of Sentence Representation in Memory.
A second issue to which this paper is addressed is much larger 
and more vaguely defined than that discussed above. This question, 
put generally, pertains to how sentence representations in long-term 
memory are organized. Several issues are involved in this area. One 
of these pertains to the conceptual level at which information 
conveyed in sentences is processed and stored in memory. Another is 
concerned with the importance of discourse variables like theme, 
topics and comments, and given and new information. A third questions 
the usefulness of purely syntactic descriptions of sentences in 
characterizing their memory representations. Aspects of all three of 
these issues are of interest here.
There have been a number of approaches to sentence memory which
15
have proposed sentence representations based on underlying semantic 
primitives, propositions, and their interrelationships (Schank, 1972; 
Brewer, 1975; Graesser, 1978; Haviland and Clark, 1974; Clark and
Chase, 1972; Clark and Clark, 1977, 1978; Kintsch, 1974). These
approaches have not generally been interested in syntactically based, 
surface structure-oriented descriptions of memory representations. 
Rather, they suggest that information contained in sentences is broken 
down into smaller, more atomistic features and then stored in memory 
as configurations of these features. Semantic categories,
particularly those identified in Filmore's case grammar theory (1968),
have been used extensively in investigations of sentence memory 
(Anderson, 1976; Tannebaum and Williams, 1968; Olson and Filby, 1972; 
Anderson and Bower, 1972, 1973; Hornby, 1972). Strong evidence for
this basic approach to sentence memory has been reported by Bransford, 
Barclay, and Franks (1972), and Johnson, Bransford, and Solomon
(1973). In a series of experiments reported by these authors and 
others (see Bransford and Franks, 1972) subjects presented with 
various sentences later falsely recognized other sentences which
conveyed information implied, but not stated, in the original 
sentences. This pattern of false recognitions was observed under 
conditions where other related distractor sentences did not elicit as 
many false positives. Similar findings from slightly different 
experimental designs have been reported by Sulin and Dooling (1974) 
and Dooling and Christiaansen, (1977). Taken as a whole these
16
experiments suggest two things. First, that information contained in 
sentences is stored in memory on a sonantic basis which is not 
necessarily related to the grammatical structure of the input
sentences themselves. Second, that this information, once integrated 
into memory, is stored in semantic proximity to preexisting knowledge 
in such a way that, if need be, the related information already 
existing in memory can be used to reconstruct the original sentence 
or, perhaps unfortunately, to falsely recognize a related distractor 
consistent with that world knowledge.
In addition to the question of abstract representation a number 
of investigators have emphasized the importance of discourse variables 
in understanding the dynamics of sentence memory. Prominent among 
these is Clark and Clark (1977, 1978) and Haviland and Clark (1974), 
whose approach keys on the concepts of given and new information.
Put simply, given information is an already established referent of 
conversation, understood implicitly by both speaker and hearer, about
which the conversation is primarily concerned. New information
represents something which is said about the given information, be it 
a comment, judgement, or elaboration. In conversation, information 
that is clearly established as given is frequently not mentioned 
explicitly, but may breplaced by a pronoun or omitted from the 
utterance altogether. Although given and new information did not 
originate with Haviland and Clark, or Clark and Clark, these writers 
have been instrumental in its application to sentence memory. Their
17
approach maintains basically that given information occupies a 
specifically designated location in memory and that new information, 
when entering memory, is attached to the given information which it
adds to or modifies. In Clark and Clark (1977), the process is
likened to a postal clerk sorting mail routed for various locations.
Perfetti and Goldman (1974, 1975) have investigated the
importance of given and new information in sentence memory. In their
studies, case grammar agents and objects were established as given or
new through the use of paragraphs differing with regard to the number 
of propositions which referred to them. Then the agents or objects
were presented individually to prompt recall of the sentence during
subsequent test sessions. Interestingly, agents were comparatively 
good cues for recall regardless of whether they were given or new. 
Objects, however, were effective cues when given but not when they 
were new. This seems to suggest that both semantic and thematic
variables are of importance for memory representations of information
contained in sentences.
This study addresses the issue of the importance of semantic,
thematic, and syntactic variables in the long-term memory
representations of sentences. On the basis of the studies reported
above, it was expected that semantic descriptions of sentences, as 
represented by the case grammar categories of agent and object, would 
be differentially effective as prompts for recall of other nouns in 
the stimulus sentences. In addition, it seemed likely that agents or
18
objects which were also given information would be more effective 
prompts than agents or objects which were new information. Finally, 
we were interested in the importance of syntactic descriptions of 
sentences in understanding their representations in memory. Although 
Anderson (1976) uses semantically defined concept nodes, the 
associative links between the nodes are organized in a fashion that 
preserves subject-predicate relations. The resulting representation 
is one that is based on semantic categories but which incorporates the 
syntactic categories of subject and predicate. It seemed of interest, 
therefore, to look at subject-predicate relations and their usefulness 
in characterizing memory representations of sentences.
Method
Subjects
Sixty-six volunteers from introductory psychology classes at the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha served as subjects, and earned course 
credits for their participation. All subjects were native English 
speakers between the ages of 18 and 50. Males and females were 
represented approximately equally.
Design
The design was a completely within-subjects, 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 
factorial. The independent variables were semantic target (agent or 
object) , thematic target (given information or new information), 
syntactic target (subject or grammatical object), and cue type
19
(original cue or mixed cue). Measures were taken of cued recall of 
sentence components and recognition of cue types as original or mixed.
Agents and objects were established as given or new through the 
use of an orienting question which preceded each stimulus sentence 
(see Appendix B). The words included in each orienting question 
represented given information established in memory before the 
stimulus sentence was presented. Information not repeated in the 
sentence itself constituted the new information and served to answer 
the question posed previously.
The manipulation of syntactic subjects and predicates was 
accomplished by alternately casting the stimulus sentences in the 
active or passive voice. This changed the grammatical structure of 
the input sentence without altering its meaning or disrupting the 
semantic relations between agent and object. The end result of the 
manipulations was that any agent or object was simultaneously either 
given or new and either part of the subject or the predicate.
Materials
Sixty-four stimulus booklets, each containing 32 sentences with 
two sentences in each of sixteen cells, were generated from 16 pairs 
of base sentences. Each pair of base sentences consisted of two 
subject-verb-object constructions which were both 'reversible* and 
'crossable.' Reversible means that each sentence could be reversed 
without loss in grammaticality or meaning. Crossable means that, 
within pairs, subjects and objects could be interchanged, enabling the
20
construction of original and mixed cues as described above. All 
possible permutations of each sentence pair were grammatical, 
image-evoking sentences which described relatively probable events 
(see appendix A).
Each stimulus booklet consisted of eight forward-version 
sentences and eight reversed version sentences. The forward-version 
sentences shared agents and the reversed-version sentences shared 
objects. In the test booklets, the target word was the component
shared by both members of each sentence pair. Half of the stimulus 
booklets contained the forward version of each sentence pair; the 
other half of the booklets contained the reversed version of those 
same sentence pairs; hence, the forward and reversed versions of each
sentence pair occurred an equal number of times across the 64 stimulus
booklets. This distribution of forward and reversed sentences 
resulted in the complete counterbalencing of the semantic
(agent-object) variable: Each sentence occurred equally frequently in
each cell, and the target word population was identical for each level 
of the variable. The remaining target-type variables were similarly 
fully counterbalanced with respect to cell membership.
For each block of four stimulus booklets there were two different 
forms of test booklets. One consisted of mixed cues formed by the 
agent or object of the first sentence in the original sentence pair 
and the verb of the second sentence in the pair. The other form of 
test booklet had mixed cues formed with the verb of the first sentence
2 1
pair and the agent or object of the second sentence pair. Mixed cues 
accounted for half of the cues presented in the test booklets. The 
other half of the presented cues were original cues formed from the 
sentence containing the verb that was used in forming the mixed cue 
for that pair in that booklet. Thus for each sentence pair there was 
one mixed cue and one original cue in every booklet. Since there were 
16 base sentence pairs presented in the stimulus booklets, each 
subject saw a total of 32 cues, 16 mixed and 16 original.
Procedure
Subjects were run in two large groups amounting to 57, with the 
remaining seven subjects run in smaller groups of three and four. 
Data from two additional subjects could not be used, one because of 
failure to follow instructions, the other due to a misplaced test 
booklet. Instructions were given orally before the distribution of 
the booklets. Included in the instructions was a very painstaking 
explanation of the nature of original and mixed cues using examples 
not among the materials. There was no indication that subjects failed 
to understand the differences between original and mixed cues.
For the stimulus booklets subjects were asked to read the 
orienting question, turn the page and read the stimulus sentence 
itself, and then to write their expansion below the stimulus sentence 
(space for this was provided on the page). Thirty-five seconds were 
allowed for each question-answer pair. Subjects were asked not to 
write continuations of the stimulus sentences, and were also requested
2 2
to avoid falling behind or getting ahead of the pace. Subjects were 
not allowed to go back to sentences previously completed. 
Observation by the experimenter during the administration of the 
experiment revealed no major departures from this procedure.
After completion of the stimulus booklets they were picked up by 
the experimenter and the test booklets were distributed, taking care 
that each subject recieved the appropriate test booklet. The 
completion of the test booklets was self-paced, but, again, subjects 
were not allowed to go back to cues already answered.
In completing the test booklets subjects were asked to fill in 
the missing word (cued recall), and to identify each cue as an 
original or a mix (recognition). After the booklets were completed, 
subjects were invited to stay for a short explanation of the purpose 
of the experimentJ
Results
Recall
Meaning preserving recall of the target items, excluding 
subordinates and superordinates, were scored as correct responses in 
the recall analysis. The number of correct responses for each subject 
in each cell was then submitted to a within-subjects 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 
analysis of variance, the variables being semantic target (agent or 
object), thematic target (given information or new information), 
syntactic target (subject or predicate) , and cue type (original cue or
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mixed cue). A main effect emerged for cue type indicating that 
original cues were more effective prompts for recall than mixed cues, 
F x(l, 63) = 12.57, p  < .001, F 2(l, 15) = 10.52, p  < 005? The means
for this were 1.59 and 1.48 for original and mixed cues, respectively. 
A three factor interaction involving semantic, thematic, and syntactic 
targets was also found, F^fl, 63) = 3.36, p  < .01. This effect did 
not, however, survive item analysis F2 (l, 15) = 1.11, p >  .05. No 
other effects approached significance in the recall analysis. 
Recognition
Hie number of correct identifications of individual cues as 
original or mixed was summed within cells for each subject and 
submitted to a four factor within-subjects analysis of variance with 
the same variables as listed above. Original cues were more likely to 
be correctly identified than mixed cues, F^l, 63) = 6.66, p  < .01; 
the means being 1.57 and 1.47 for original and mixed cues, 
respectively. This difference was not reliable across items, however, 
F2(l, 15) = 2.02, p  > .05. In addition, a two factor interaction
occurred involving the semantic variable (agent or object) and the 
syntactic variable (subject or predicate). This was good across both 
subjects and items F x(l, 63) = 4.40, p  < .05, F2 (l, 15) = 4.53, p  <
.05 (see Table 1).
To examine the degree of relationship between recall and 
recognition, recall and recognition scores were collapsed across cells 
and summed for each subject. The resulting correlation was quite high
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T A B L E  1
M e a n  n u m b e r  of cues c o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  as o r i g i n a l  or 
m i x e d  across s e m a n t i c  ( a g e n t - o b j e c t )  and s y n t a c t i c  (subject-  
p r e d i c a t e )  cue c o n d i t i o n s .
A g e n t  Cue
Subj ect P r e d i c a t e
O b j e c t  Cue
Subj ect P r e d i c a t e
1.539 1.484 1.477 1.590
N o t e . The c o n d i t i o n s  s h o w n  h e r e  are c l a s s i f i e d  by cue 
type, not t arget type. For example, "Agent cue -- s u b j e c t "  
m e a n s  that the cue c o n s i s t e d  of a n o u n  w h i c h  was b o t h  agent 
and subject, pl us a verb.
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(r = +.85, N = 64, p < .001), suggesting that correctly recognized 
cues were likely to prompt recall.
To determine if the advantage of original cues was related to 
recognition performance, an additional recall analysis was conducted 
using only those recall trials where the cue was correctly recognized. 
This was accomplished by collapsing across the three target-type 
variables and computing the proportion of correct recall responses to 
correctly identified original and mixed cues. A one-factor analysis 
of variance between original and mixed cues indicated that original 
cues retained their advantage even when all cues were correctly 
identified, F^l, 63) = 32.45, p  < .001, F2(l, 15) = 21.75, p  < .001,
(see Table 2).
An analysis of the expansions which were generated by subjects 
during the study period showed that almost half were grammatical 
continuations of the stimulus sentences. Since Anderson and Bower 
(1972) suggested that configural effects were a result of 
continuations, it seemed necessary to determine if the configural 
effect obtained here was a result of the continuations. Accordingly, 
the data from those subjects who had written continuations for over 
80% of the stimulus sentences was contrasted with those subjects who 
wrote continuations for less than 20% of the stimulus sentences. 
Most of those in the latter group wrote no continuations at all. The 
resulting classification excluded seven subjects who wrote 
continuations for somewhere between 80% and 20% of the stimulus
2 6
T A B L E  2
M e a n  p r o p o r t i o n  r e c a l l  for o r i g i n a l  and m i x e d  cues in the 
o v e r a l l  a n a l y s i s  and in the c o r r e c t  cue r e c o g n i t i o n  analysis.
O r i g i n a l  M i x e d
Cues Cues
O v e r a l l  .793 .740
W h e n  cue
c o r r e c t l y  .903 .765
re c o g n i  zed
I n c r e a s e 1 1 .0 % 2 .5%
27
sentences, and two subjects who wrote unciassifiable expansions, 
leaving 26 subjects in the continuation group and 29 subjects in the 
expansion group. An unweighted means, five-factor analysis of 
variance was performed with the same four with in-subjects variables 
described above plus a between-subjects variable created by the two 
level classification of expansion types. If continuations were indeed 
responsible for the advantage of original cues in recall this would be 
apparent in the interaction between cue type and expansion type. No 
such interaction emerged. The advantage of original cues was 
expressed as a main effect for cue type, F^l, 52) = 13.35, p  < .001,
suggesting that continuations were not responsible for the observed 
advantage of original cues in recall.
Discussion
Gestalt Properties of Sentence Representations in Memory.
The results of the present study marshall strong evidence for the 
existence of Gestalt properties in memory representations, and further 
suggest that meaningfulness, as opposed to other explanations 
(Anderson and Bower, 1972? Foss and Harwood, 1975), is the variable 
which produces configural effects in some experiments and not others. 
This is evident from the observed advantage of original cues in recall 
and from the persistence of this advantage independent of the 
generation of continuations. These results tend to disconfirm 
strictly associative accounts of sentence memory which cannot explain
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configural effects in recall and which do not utilize Gestalt-like 
representations of sentences. It seems apparent that updated models 
of sentence memory need to incorporate mechanisms and representations 
which can handle configural properties.
Anderson's ACT model, which predicts an advantage for original 
cues in recall, is supported by the present findings even though the 
ACT hypothesis with regard to encoding productions was not confirmed. 
In review, it was reasoned that, in order to correctly recognize a 
mixed cue one would presumably have access to the memory 
representations of both members of the original sentence pair. Given 
access to both representations, recall of the target word is highly 
likely. Therefore, if recall analysis uses only those cues which were 
correctly recognized, the advantage of original cues in recall should 
be greatly attenuated. The present findings did not support this 
reasoning. Not only did the advantage of original cues in recall 
persist, it increased in magnitude. The source of the increase stems 
from the fact that recall under the correct cue recognition condition 
increased more for original cues than for mixed cues, although recall 
for both increased relative to the overall analysis (see Table 2). 
There is, however, a possible explanation for this outcome which does 
not reflect poorly on Anderson's treatment of the subject. This is 
that having access to both representations of the original sentence 
pair is probably not the only condition under which a cue is 
identified as mixed. From the subject's point of view, a cue which
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appears largely unfamiliar is likely to be a mixed cue. Thus, there 
are at least two situations in which a mixed cue is correctly 
identified. One, when the subject has access to both representations 
and knows it is a mixed cue, and two, when the cue appears unfamiliar 
to the subject and s/he suspects that it is a mixed cue. Recognition 
of an original cue, on the other hand, is more likely to involve 
complete access to the memory representation. Hius, correct 
recognition of mixed cues tends to select those cases in which 
subjects were unsure, and recall analysis under this condition would 
show that the size of the difference gets larger. It seems, then, 
that Anderson's treatment of this problem is yet to be disconfirmed.
The recognition analysis also indicated that original cues were 
more likely to be correctly identified than mixed cues. However, 
because this effect did not generalize beyond the language sample used 
here, it seems inappropriate to assign much importance to it. If this 
had generalized to other materials it would support Carr and Bacharach 
(1978), and would reinforce the intuitive notion that an original cue 
is more likely to prompt positive recognition than a mixed cue.
It seems warranted to conclude that memory representations for 
sentences processed for meaning have Gestalt characteristics not 
accounted for by the strictly associative models like HAM and LNR. 
Moreover, these Gestalt characteristics persist even when the subject 
is the target in addition to the more usual case when the object is 
the target. In the way of speculation it is suggested that meaning is
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the key to understanding this phenomenon. In the in case which 
sentences are processed in a shallow fashion it seems sensible that 
the component words are treated as a string of items with weak 
interassociations which might be adequately described in an 
associative framework. However, when stimulus sentences are processed 
for meaning they become more than just associated words. Rather, they 
function as vehicles for information that is characterized by certain 
relationships among agents, verbs, and objects. In order to preserve 
the meaning of a sentence, as opposed to its superficial 
characteristics, the relationships between agent, verb, and object 
must be contained in its memory representation. Without all of these 
interrelationships the meaning is lost. It makes sense, therefore, 
that any v till designed language processor be capable of preserving 
these relationships in memory when asked to process linguistic input 
in a meaningful manner. This fundamental point may not be the case 
when memory is applied to other stimuli.
Organization of Sentence Representations in Memory.
The results with regard to the second major issue addressed in 
this paper are not nearly so clear as they are with the first. TVo 
marginal effects were observed. The first of these is a three-factor 
interaction among semantic target (agent or object), thematic target 
(given or new information), and syntactic target (subject or 
predicate), in the recall analysis. The second, in the recognition 
analysis, was a two-factor interaction between semantic target and
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syntactic target. Both interactions contributed to less than one 
percent of the total variance. Since the former did not generalize 
across items it is questionable whether it deserves interpretation at 
all beyond pointing out that it may have been a peculiar artifact of 
the stimulus sentences. Hie latter effect did, however, generalize 
across items and thus warrants closer examination.
Table 1 shows the mean recognition accuracy under the semantic 
and syntactic variable combinations (classified by their cue type, not 
their respective targets). A visual scan of the means suggests that 
agent-subjects and object-predicates were more accurately recognized 
as original or mixed than were object-subjects and agent-predicates. 
On the basis of past work (Perfetti and Goldman, 1974, 1975; Carr and 
Bacharach, 1978) it would be expected, if anything, that 
agent-subjects and agent-predicates would be most readily 
identifiable, and that object-subjects and object-predicates would be 
less identifiable. So on the surface this interaction makes little 
contact with previous work. However, if an ACT representation is
assumed the problem becomes more tractable. In ACT (Anderson, 1976)
sentences that are presented in the passive voice are transformed into 
their active form during encoding and then stored in memory. When
retrieved, the information contained in the sentence is likely to be 
phrased in the active voice, a tendency which has been demonstrated
amply elsewhere (Mehler, 1963; James, Thompson, and Baldwin, 1973). 
Looking again at the means in Table 1, it can be seen that recognition
32
is better for the two types of cues in the active voice: 
agent-subjects and object-predicates. It might have been, therefore, 
that subjects were less likely to recover the appropriate information 
when it was stored in a format that didn*t match the form of the probe 
(as in a passive cue), than when the storage format did match the 
probe (as in an active cue). Although this explanation is by 
necessity quite speculative, the basic premise is consistent with 
previous work and might be investigated profitably.
Of greater importance is understanding why none of the main 
effects or interactions that were, it was felt, rather safely 
predicted, turned out. On the basis of Perfetti and Goldman (1974, 
1975), James, Thompson, and Baldwin (1973), Carr and Bacharach, 
(1978), and others, either main effects or interactions should have 
been observed for the semantic and thematic variables. Specifically, 
agents should have been more effective cues for recall than objects, 
given information should have been a more effective prompt than new 
information, and objects should have been significantly more effective 
when given than when new. Not even a hint of these effects emerged.
With regard to given and new information a potential explanation 
for this outcome is that the manipulation made in this experiment 
failed to adequately establish the information that was supposed to be 
given as in fact given information. Perfetti and Goldman (1974, 1975) 
used paragraphs to establish the themes of sentences while in the 
present experiment questions were used. It might have been that the
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questions simply weren't salient enough, or long enough, to elicit the 
kind of elaboration necessary to establish the information in them as 
given. This would have occurred if subjects processed the questions 
only superficially, or disregarded them altogether. Since no 
manipulation check is possible, this explanation must remain 
conjectural.
The absence of effects for the semantic (agent-object) variable 
might be explained in two ways. First, it could be argued that there 
is no real effect to find with regard to agent-object manipulations in 
studies of sentence memory. To our knowledge the present effort is 
the first experiment that has fully equated the target populations for 
agents and objects. That is, all of the target nouns used in this 
experiment served as agents for half of the stimulus sentences and as 
objects for the remainder. All of the previous studies suggesting 
that this sort of effect exists have either not specifically mentioned 
how agent-object target populations were counterbalenced, or equated 
different target populations on the basis of printed frequency (James, 
Thompson, and Baldwin, 1973) or printed frequency, imagery, and 
concreteness (Perfetti and Goldman, 1974, 1975). It is possible that 
equating for various dimensions of meaning and usage fails to capture 
properties of words capable of producing the observed effects. 
Although this is arguing from null results, the absence of the 
predicted effects in the one case where the target populations were 
fully counterbalenced is somewhat compelling.
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A second potential explanation stems from the idea that, in any 
recall situation, there are two factors contributing to the 
probability that a given piece of information will be retrieved from 
memory* These are the effectiveness of the cue in activating the 
trace, and the strength of the trace itself. The effectiveness of a 
cue would seem to depend on the amount of information it contains and 
how much it resembles the information to be recalled. The strength of 
the trace would be determined in part by the number of times it has 
been retrieved, and perhaps by the amount of elaboration associated 
with it. In the present experiment it seems possible that these two 
processes were pitted against one another.
Suppose, for instance, that cue effectiveness was the operative 
variable in the production of recall differences between agents and 
objects. The predicted relationship would be that agents were better 
cues for recall of objects than were objects for recall of agents. 
This would mean, in terms of the dependent measure used here, that 
objects were more likely to be recalled than agents. This cue 
effectiveness paradigm was used, for example, by Perfetti and Goldman 
(1974, 1975). Suppose, on the other hand, that trace strength is the 
operative variable, as inferred in the Carr and Bacharach (1978) 
study. In our experiment this would predict that agents were more 
likely to be recalled than objects— the exact opposite of the result 
expected from a cue effectiveness interpretation. In the cued recall 
procedure used in this experiment it seems likely that recall in any
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given instance was a function of both cue effectiveness and trace 
strength. Hie problem is that these normally complimentary processes 
become antagonistic with respect to the dependent measure used here. 
The cue effectiveness process tends to elevate object recall at the 
expense of agent recall; the trace strength process tends to elevate 
agent recall at the expense of object recall. Hie two effects then 
cancel each other out.
The problem is avoided in Perfetti and Goldman because they 
assessed cue effectiveness with agents and objects alone, not when 
pitted against each other in the same sentence. Hi is wash out
problem, if it exists as described here, is a product of the 
particular cued recall procedure used in this experiment.
Both of these possibilities remain speculative in the absence of 
corroborative evidence. Hie fact that no positive results were 
obtained in this portion of the experiment does not constitute 
sufficient grounds for the conclusion that the predicted effect does 
not, in fact, exist. Hie question is still open.
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Footnotes
•Hftiis experiment was conducted in full accordance with the 
ethical guidelines for research established by the American 
Psychological Association. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants, acknowledging their right to withdraw from the 
experiment at any time without prejudicing their relationship with the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha. No deceptive procedures were used.
2Item analysis refers to a statistical procedure, popular in 
psycholinguistic research, which is designed to infer whether some 
given effect, already generalizable to other subjects, can in addition 
be generalized to language materials other than those used in the 
experiment. For this experiment, the item analysis involved the 
computation of two analyses of variance, one treating subjects as the 
random variable, the second treating items as the random variable. 
In reporting the results, the symbol F1is used to denote the F-ratio 
resulting from the analysis of variance (AOV) with subjects as the 
random variable; while the symbol F2 is used to denote the F-ratio 
resulting from the AOV with items as the random variable. When both ^  
and F2are significant, the effect in question is usually considered to 
be reliable across both subjects and items.
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Appendix 
Pair Is 
Pair 2: 
Pair 3: 
Pair 4: 
Pair 5: 
Pair 6: 
Pair 7: 
Pair 8: 
Pair 9: 
Pair 10: 
Pair 11: 
Pair 12: 
Pair 13: 
Pair 14: 
Pair 15: 
Pair 16:
A: Base Sentence Pairs Used in the Experiment
The doctor advised the lawyer.
The doctor confronted the priest.
The spy decievc 3 the general.
The spy captured the informant.
The sergeant subdued the prisoner.
The sergeant disliked the captain.
The reporter embarrassed the actress. 
The reporter insulted the congressman.
The quarterback threatnened the referee. 
The quarterback kicked the spectator.
The janitor startled the student.
The janitor stopped the secretary.
The government condemned the dissident. 
The government irritated the military.
The executive appraised the applicant. 
The executive ignored the creditor.
The stewardess criticized the pilot.
The stewardess questioned the passenger.
The historian bored the author.
The historian admired the judge.
The baron saved the queen.
The baron despised the peasants.
The policeman recognized the bellboy. 
The policeman avoided the commissioner.
The cavalry surrounded the Romans.
The cavalry harassed the indians.
The landlord misunderstood the tenant. 
The landlord cheated the electrician.
The delegate greeted the ambassador.
The delegate persuaded the committee.
The farmer believed the banker.
The farmer distrusted the salesman.
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AGENT OBJECT
Given New Given New
Subj Pred Subj Pred Subj Pred Subj Pred
Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx
Ill 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 2 0 1 2 2
112 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
113 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
114 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
121 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
122 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
123 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
124 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
211 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
212 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
213 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
214 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 2
221 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
222 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
223 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
224 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
311 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
312 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 0
313 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 0
314 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 0
321 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 1
322 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
323 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
324 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
411 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 2 2
412 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
413 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
414 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1
421 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
422 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1
423 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
424 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 2 2
Appendix D: Raw data for recall. Three digit number in leftmost column
indicates booklet number, test number, and subject number, 
respectively. Scores belong to cells as indicated. Recall 
data continued on next page.
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AGENT
Given New
Subj Pred Subj Pred
Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx
511 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 0
512 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
513 0 2 2 0 1 2 2 2
514 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
521 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
522 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
523 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 2
524 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
612 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
611 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
613 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
614 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
621 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
622 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
623 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
624 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
711 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0
712 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0
713 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
714 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
721 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 1
722 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
723 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
724 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
811 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 2
812 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
813 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
814 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
821 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1
822 1 0 2 1 2 0 2 1
823 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
824 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
OBJECT 
Given New
Subj Pred Subj Pred
Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 1 2 2 0 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 0 1 0 2 0
1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 2 0 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1
1 1 0 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 1 0 2 2 1 2
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 0 2 2 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
45
AGENT OBJECT
Given New Given New
Subj Pred Subj Pred Subj Pred Subj Pred
Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx
Ill 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
112 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
113 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
114 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
121 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
122 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
123 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
124 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
211 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
212 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
213 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0
214 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0
221 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
222 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
223 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
224 1 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
311 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
312 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
313 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 2 1 2
314 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 0
321 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 2 1 1 2 2
322 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
323 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
324 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
411 2 2 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1
412 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1
413 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0
414 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 1
421 1 2 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 0
422 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1
423 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
424 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
Appendix E: Raw data for recognition. Three digit number in leftmost
column indicates booklet number, test number, and subject 
number, respectively. Scores belong to cells as indicated. 
Recognition data continued on next page.
511
512
513
514
521
522
523
524
612
611
613
614
621
622
623
624
711
712
713
714
721
722
723
724
811
812
813
814
821
822
823
824
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AGENT
Given New
Subj Pred Subj Pred
Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or M:
1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0
2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 2 2 1 1 2 2 0
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 0 1 0 2 1 2 0
1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
2 0 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 0 2 1 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 0 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 0 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 1 0 1 1 2 0 2
2 1 1 1 2 2 1 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
2 0 2 2 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2
2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 0 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 2 1 2 0
1 2 2 0 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
OBJECT 
Given New
Subj Pred Subj Pred
Or Mx Or Mx Or Mx Or M:
0 0 0 0 n 0 2 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 1 2 2 0 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
2 0 2 0 2 1 2 0
0 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 0 2 2 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 2 0 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 0 0 2 2 1 1
0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 1 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 0 2 0 2
1 0 2 2 2 1 1 2
0 2 1 2 2 0 2 2
2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 2 0 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
